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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BESSIE AUERBACH, MADELINE A. 
WERNER, and SELMA A. MOHR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
FANNIE F. A. SAMUELS, L. R. 
S A M U E L S, FREDERICK FOX 
AUERBACH, and WALKER BANK 
&TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8979 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts correctly describes the nature 
of the action and accurately depicts the judgment of the lower 
court. However, because appellants have not complied with 
the requirement of Rule 75 (p) ( 2), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
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cedure, that the brief contain a "reference to the pages of the 
record supporting" each statement, and because appellants' 
brief is so interlarded with .statements having no support in 
the record, it would be uneconomical to attempt to controvert 
each inaccurate statement. We will, therefore, generally con. 
trovert the appellants' statement of facts and offer our own. 
The action was brought by appellants for a declaratory 
judgment construing certain terms of a trust created in the 
last will and testament of Frederick S. Auerbach. There was 
also a prayer for injunctive relief. The complaint (R. 1), to 
which was attached and incorporated by reference a copy of 
the will (R. 11-18) and a letter relating to construction of 
the trust (R. 19), together with the answer to the complaint, 
contain the only facts. At the hearing both sides joined in asking 
the trial court to decide the whole case on the facts before it 
(R. 41). 
The following material facts are established by the plead-
ings: The _testator, Frederick S. Auerbach, died on May 28, 
1938, in Salt Lake City (R. 1, 35). Respondents Fannie F. A. 
Samuels and Frederick Fox Auerbach are trustees and bene-
ficiaries under the will (R. 12, 15). Respondents L. R. Samuels 
and Walker Bank and Trust Company are trustees under the 
will, having been nominated by Fannie F. A. Samuels (R. 3, 
35), pursuant to a power given her in the will (R. 16, 17). 
At the time of his death Frederick S. Auerbach had four 
living sisters, three of whom are the appellants in this action. 
The fourth died in 1949 (R. 4, 35). 
The testator left the residue of his estate in trust, the 
income to be paid "to my beloved wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, 
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for and during the term of her natural life, and upon her 
death* * *to my son, _Frederick Fox Auerbach for and during 
the term of his natural life," and portions of the principal to 
be paid to the son on his having reached the ages of thirty 
and forty-five. The trustees were empowered to anticipate 
payment of principal to the son within certain limits (R. 12, 
13) . Upon the death of both the widow and the son the trust 
was to terminate and the corpus to be distributed to the son's 
"then living issue" or, in default of issue, to the testator's 
"living sisters" (R. 14). The provisions of the trust relating 
to the interests of the various beneficiaries and their rights to 
income and principal are set out in the fourth clause of the 
will (R. 12-14). The clause appears to be accurately reprinted 
on pages 7 and 8 of the appellants' brief. 
On August 15, 1958, respondents served upon appellants 
and thereafter filed with the Court a motion for a summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
procedure (R. 38). The motion came on for hearing before 
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., on October 24, 1958, at which 
time appellants orally moved for a summary judgment in their 
favor, respondents waived the time requirement of Rule 56 
(c), and the parties joined in requesting the court to dispose 
of the whole case (R. 41). No evidence having been offered 
by testimony, affidavit or exhibit, the only facts before the 
trial court were found in the pleadings, including the will and 
letter. 
Notwithstanding this condition of the record, appellants 
have apparently considered it to be proper to give the court 
some "background information" that would be "helpful" in 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
understanding the terms of the will. Spread across pages 15 
through 23 of appellants' brief are found what purport to 
be facts-though conveniently placed in the argument. Re-
spondents have not had an opportunity to rebut the recited 
facts; and counsel do not wish to contest with opposing counsel 
as to whose "brief-testimony" is most credible. Suffice it to 
say that there is nothing in the record about the "chief prop-
erties" owned by the deceased; the closeness nor openness of 
any family enterprise; the death of any father; the disposition 
of any stock and the management of any store; the relationships 
of three brothers or their sisters; the marriages of Frederick 
and George; Fox family property interests; whether George 
predeceased Frederick; George's wife, Beatrice; who, if anyone, 
received George's interest in any store; whether George and 
Beatrice had any sons or daughters; who controlled or managed 
any store after George's death; whether Herbert ever married 
or had any children; whether anyone was the only son born 
to the three brothers; who could rely on Herbert and to what 
extent; whether Herbert and Frederick were "close"; the 
closeness of the family relationship; whether Frederick or 
Herbert ever had any thoughts about any other family con-
trolling any store; whether there were any reciprocal option 
provisions between anyone; the concern of Frederick for making 
a "harmonious provision" for his wife; the Fox family attorney 
and whether he would adequately advise anyone; the "long-
range objectives" of the decedent; whether his "wife and boy 
were devoid of any business experience" and, if so, whether 
he realized it; whether Fannie would be dependent upon or 
influenced by anyone; to whom Herbert might leave his interest 
in stock; whether and to what extent any interest in any 
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store would stand directly between anyone and anyone; what 
the long-range interest of the decedent's son were or how 
they would be accomplished; whether decedent had any 
thoughts about anybody getting an upper hand, or what families 
might sanction management of any store; whether the family 
situation was simple or complicated, common or unique; 
whether decedent had any desires with respect to voting control; 
whether there was ever any question in testator's mind that 
any stock might be "squandered or disposed of" by his son; 
what would happen if testator's widow outlived his sisters, 
or who their heirs would be or are; or what "the last thing 
in the world" was that the testator intended. 
Apparently the background information so meticulously 
written into appellants' brief was not regarded as probative 
until the trial court had construed the will contrary to the 
contentions of appellants. There were, however, facts before 
the court which do bear upon the construction of the will; 
they are found in the will itself. For example, in the intro· 
ductory portion of the will (R. 11) the testator identifies the 
natural objects of his bounty: 
"I declare that I am about 46 years of age; that my 
home and place of business is in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; that I am a married man 
and that my immediate family consists of my wife, 
Fannie Fox Auerbach, and our son Frederick Fox 
Auerbach; that I have full possession of my faculties 
and that I am deciding and acting in the premises of 
my own free will and not under the pressure of duress, 
fraud or any undue or improper influence whatsoever." 
The entire residue of his estate was given to trustees (R. 
12). The trust contains a provision that the testator's son is 
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to have varying amounts of principal paid to him depending 
upon his age at the time his interest vests in possession (R. 13). 
The fourth clause of the will also provides for termination 
of the trust upon the death of both the testator's widow and 
son (R. 14). 
The will was executed at Hartford, Connecticut, on Feb-
ruary 15, 1936 (R. 18). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court correctly construed the terms.of the Frederick 
S. Auerbach trust. 
2. The appeal should be dismissed, or the judgment af-
firmed, for appellants' flagrant disregard of the requirements 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. The appellants are not entitled to costs or attorneys' 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE TERMS 
OF THE FREDERICKS. AUERBACH TRUST. 
Respondents agree with appellants that the court, in con-
struing the will of Frederick S. Auerbach, must give effect to 
the testator's intention. Our statute expressly requires this. See 
74-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953. However, the appellants 
have not sought to find the intention from the will in accordance 
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with 74-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, but have used what 
might be called the "backward" or "bootstrap" method. They 
assume an intention, buttress it with background material 
(written by them especially for the purpose) and argue that 
the provisions of the will are not inconsistent with what they 
have stated the testator's intention to have been. The trial 
court did not need to conjure facts in order to ascertain the 
intention of the testator. It had before it the testator's own 
words and a substantial body of precedent. 
The problem presented in this action, which relates to 
acceleration of remainders, is not exclusively a trust problem 
but one encountered throughout the law of property whether 
the interests involved are legal or equitable. It is now well 
settled that, in the absence of an expressed contrary intention, 
remainders under a will, a deed, or a trust instrument are 
accelerated upon the failure or premature termination of a 
precedent estate. Some of the earlier cases or writers attempted 
to make distinctions between vested and contingent remainder, 
and between the failure of the precedent estate to vest and 
its premature termination after having vested. The distinction 
was thought necessary at one time because of the fear of 
"gaps and lapses," represented by the requirement that some· 
one be seised of the property at all times. However, upon 
recognition of "executory interests" such distinctions have 
become unimportant. The courts have taken the view that by 
accelerating remainders they are doing what the testator would 
have done had he thought about it-whether the remainder 
is vested or contingent, and whether the prior estate didn't 
vest at all or terminated prior to occurrence of a specified event. 
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Two cases, recent enough to be modern but ancient enough 
to be respected, have concerned themselves specifically with 
a termination of a prior estate after a period of enjoyment by 
the life tenant. A case quite like our own is Bennett et al. v. 
Fidelity Union Trust Co. (1938) 123 N. J. Eq. 198, 196 Atl. 
375, in which the court held that the widow's release of her 
interest in three trusts accelerated the succeeding interests. 
The provisions of the will are set out in the report of an earlier 
consideration of the case ( 193 7) 122 N. J. Eq. 455, 194 Atl. 
449. The first trust provided that the net income be paid to 
testator's wife during her life or widowhood, and "upon her 
death or remarriage whichever shall sooner occur, to divide 
the principal between my said two sons." The second trust 
provided that the net income be paid equally among the wife 
and two sons during the life of the wife "and then to divide" 
the principal "equally between my said two sons." The third 
trust provided that the income be divided among the wife 
and the two sons during the wife's life, and thereafter between 
the two sons until the younger attained age 50, "when (the 
principal) shall be equally divided between my said sons." 
There were also gifts over in event the sons predeceased the 
widow. After receiving benefits under the trust for a period 
of time the widow sought to accelerate her sons' enjoyment by 
releasing the trustee from all further liability to her. The 
··release'' method was adopted by the widow after an earlier 
assignment of her interest to the children had been held 
not to accelerate for the reason that the widow's estate had 
been transferred but not terminated. The court held that the 
release effectually terminated the widow's life estate and 
accelerated the right of the sons to distribution of principal, t: 
10 
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notwithstanding such distribution would extinguish the right 
of certain contingent substitutionary remaindermen. The court 
stated the rule to be that, where no different intention is 
expressed in the will, it is the rule that "on termination of a 
life estate by some cause other than the life tenant's death" 
the property will pass "in exactly the same way as if the ter-
mination had been caused by the life tenant's death." 
In discussing application of the rule the court said: 
"Examination of the will leads to the conclusion that 
there is no indication therein of any intent which 
should result in a determination that such general rule 
should not be applied in the instant case. It shows that 
the testator was primarily concerned with the benefac-
tions to his wife and his two sons; and that he was not 
concerned with any particular persons or class of 
persons (other than that they be lineal descendants) as 
beneficiaries subsequent to or in lieu and stead of 
his wife and sons. At the time the will was drafted, 
some of the children of the sons were not yet born; 
none was over a year or two old. The testator expressly 
provided that the funds should go to his two sons 
at the termination of his wife's life estate by her death 
(provided they had then both attained age 50). There 
is every reason to believe that he would wish to go 
likewise on determination of the widow's life estate 
prior to her death (provided the sons had attained 
age 50, as they have), and that he would have no 
desire to keep open for the sons' children the oppor-
tunity of taking the corpus in the contingency that 
the widow should survive the sons, notwithstanding 
that he might well prefer to prevent, if he could, the 
surrender of the life estate by the wife. 
"The provisions as to distribution after the wife's 
death was obviously not for the purpose of determining 
11 
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beneficiaries at the time of such death, because as to 
the main trust he provided that the distribution should 
not occur until the sons attained age 50, and he 
obviously contemplated that that would occur after the 
wife's death; and as to one of the other trusts, he 
provided that the wife's life estate should terminate 
on her remarriage." 
In our case the will shows that the testator was primarily 
concerned with the benefactions to his wife and son, and there 
is every reason to believe that (except for one-third expressly 
reserved) he would have no desire to keep open for the son's 
issue-or testator's sisters or their heirs-the opportunity of 
taking the other two-thirds of the corpus in event the widow 
should survive the son. With respect to distribution to his 
son, age was obviously more important than survivorship since 
the testator expressly referred to the ages at which principal 
must or might be paid to his son. 
Another case involving termination of a life estate after 
a period of enjoyment is Singleton v. Gordon et al. (1943) 
60 Wyo. 26, 144 P.2d 138. In this case Miriam Gordon, prior 
to February 3, 1938, owned realty subject to a life estate in 
her husband. She deeded the property to Leonard E. Singleton 
subject to a life estate in her and her husband, but to his "then 
living heirs" if his death occurred prior to the death of the 
survivor of the husband and wife. After the husband's death 
the widow conveyed to Singleton, expressing an intention to 
accelerate his interest. In a declaratory judgment action the 
trial court held that the "heirs" of Singleton had a contingent 
remainder which would vest is Singleton didn't survive the 
widow, and that the prior estate could not be accelerated. 
On appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed. It stated 
12 
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that unless the grantor expresses a contrary intention, if the 
life estate is effectively terminated, regardless of the method 
of termination, a vested remainder becomes an estate in pos-
session. The court said that it makes no difference whether 
we are talking about deeds or wills and that the conveyance 
of the life estate of Singleton had cut off the contingent rights 
of the substitutionary remaindermen, Singleton's heirs. 
The above cases deal specifically with the acceleration of 
a subsequent estate where the prior estate had actually vested 
and had been enjoyed for a period of time by the life tenant. 
However, there appears to be no valid reason for distinguishing 
between a "failure" and a "termination," and the courts have 
not appeared to regard the distinction as an important one. 
There are a large number of cases dealing with the acceleration 
of remainders where the original or precedent state does not, 
for some reason, vest. Their rationale is equally applicable to 
termination. 
The rule of acceleration of remainders is an "intention 
furthering," not an "intention defeating" rule. In Nelson et al. 
v. Meade et al. (1930) 129 Me. 61, 149 Atl. 626, the testator 
devised $5,000 to his widow "in trust" to receive the income 
for her life, together with a right to invade the principal, and 
on her death to named children "or so many of them as may 
be alive" at the death of the widow. The widow predeceased 
the testator and the court applied the rule of acceleration, 
stating that the rule was based upon the "presumed intention" 
of the testator. 
In Keen et al v. Brooks et ux. ( 1946) 186 Md. 543, 47 
A. 2d 67, 164 A.L.R. 1292, there was a gift to testator's 
13 
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daughter for life and upon her death to the testator's grand-
children, but if any grandchild were deceased, to the issue 
of such grandchild. The court held that upon renunciation of 
the life estate the subsequent estates were accelerated: 
"Upon renunciation, there was no occasion for the 
continuance of the trust. No conditions, other than 
the termination of the preceding estate, were attached, 
and the persons taking the succeeding estate were 
ascertained. The alternative devises to the issue of 
the remaindermen, or perhaps to the heirs or next of 
kin of the testator, in the event that both grandchildren 
should die without issue during the continuance of the 
preceding estates, were clearly substitutional, and 
could hardly be construed as conditions precedent." 
In re Schultz's Estate ( 1897) 113 Mich. 592, 72 N.W. 
1079, was a case in which the testator devised a life estate 
in certain property to his widow and in another clause pro-
vided that if any of the remaindermen were dead at the time 
of death of the widow, the heirs of the deceased legatee would 
take. The widow renounced. The probate court's order of 
immediate distribution was reversed by the circuit court but 
reinstated by the Supreme Court, which said: 
"The clear intent of the will was to secure the widow 
the use of the entire estate for life, and that upon 
termination of the life estate, the legatees mentioned 
in the fourth and fifth clauses should take. The life 
estate in the widow was as effectually terminated by 
her election as it could be by her death. * * * The 
clear intent of the testator was to create a life estate, 
and it probably never occurred to him that his wife 
would take under the statute and thus terminate such 
estate." 
14 
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In Fisch v. Fisch et al. (1929) 105 N. ]. Eq. 746, 155 
Atl. 146, the disputed clause in the will reads as follows: 
"All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, 
real, personal, or mixed wheresoever situate, I give, 
devise and bequeath to my executors hereinafter named, 
in trust for the following uses and purposes: 
"1. To pay the net income thereof to my wife, Fannie 
Fisch for and during her natural life: 
"2. Upon the death of my wife, Fannie Fisch, the 
corpus of my estate shall be divided into two equal 
parts and I give, devise and bequeath one part to my 
son, Leroy L. Fisch forever, and one part I give, devise 
and bequeath to my daughter, Sylvia B. Fisch forever. 
The issue of any deceased child taking the share of such 
child per stirpes." 
In construing the provisions of the will and holding that 
the remainders accelerated the court said: 
"This case must, of course, be decided upon what the 
intent of the testator was, and that intent is to be 
gathered from the will itself. The law favors vesting, 
not contingency, and our courts do not usually substi-
tute arbitrary rules for the intention of the testator. 
"In my opinion the testator intended the provision 
for the issue to be to continue the gift to the children 
dying before the termination of the life estate in the 
manner prescribed by the will or in any other manner 
to the issue of the child so dying. * * * 
"Where there is a provision for a life estate and 
a remainder, the postponement of the vesting in posses-
sion of the remainder is merely for the purpose of 
providing for the life estate and upon elimination of 
that estate in any manner at all, the remainder vests. 
"The fact that testator, after providing for a re-
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mainder to his children upon the death of the life 
tenant, stated that the issue of a remainderman should 
take the share of the remainderman, does not mean 
that he intended a gift over to issue contingent upon 
the death of the parent before the natural death of 
the life tenant. Postponement of enjoyment for the 
remainder is only for the purpose of letting in the 
particular estate. When a testator provides that the 
survivors of the class upon the death of the first taker 
shall take, it does not imply that he had any par-
ticular desire that the survivors at any specified time 
should be the only beneficiaries. The first taker might 
die immediately after the testator and all of the class 
would take. What the testator had in mind was, as 
I see it, that he did not intend that any person should 
benefit from his estate except the survivors of the 
class when the estate should vest in possession. He 
only postponed the vesting in possession for the benefit 
of the particular estate. And so when he uses language 
to the effect that the issue of one of the class shall 
take, he does not mean that he has a desire to benefit 
the issue apart from the members of the class. * * * 
He meant that the share of any individual of the 
class should not go to a survivor, but that the line 
should benefit. He does not mean issue at any par-
ticular time, and the postponement is only for the 
purpose of determining the beneficiaries. * * * " 
In Union National Bank of Charlotte v. Easterby et al. 
(1952) 236 N. C. 599, 73 S.E. 2d 54, the will devised the 
residue of the testator's estate to the Bank as trustee, for the 
use and benefit of testator's wife, for her life, and at the death 
of the wife, the corpus of the trust was to be delivered by the 
trustee in equal portions to the testator's two sisters and his 
brother, Hugh Easterby. The will also provided: 
"If at the death of my wife, either of my above 
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named two sisters of my aforesaid brother, Hugh, or 
two of them, should not be livng, my trust estate shall 
be divided equally between such of my said two sisters 
and my said brother as may be living at the time of 
the death of my said wife. If, at the time of the death 
of my said wife, neither of my aforesaid two sisters 
nor my said brother, Hugh, is living, then my trust 
estate shall be distributed to my heirs and next of 
kin, just as though I had died as of the time of the 
death of my wife intestate." 
The wife elected not to take under the will and the Court 
held that the next estate was accelerated, taking the view that, 
insofar as the remaindermen were concerned, the widow's 
election "was equivalent to her death," since the estate given 
to the widow "was not created in any sense for the independent 
purpose of postponing the disposition of his estate until the 
death of his wife should she dissent from his will." 
In Scotten v. Moore (Del. 1914) 93 Atl. 373, Ann. Cas. 
1918C, 409, the testator gave all his estate, after the payment 
of his debts, to his wife for life, and after her death to "my 
then living children (or in case of their death, to their legal 
representatives), share and share alike." 
In considering the effect of this language and whether a 
remainder could be accelerated, the court said: 
"In this case it is clear that the testator, Emory 
Scotten, intended to make, first of all, ample provision 
for his wife, by giving to her all his estate for life. 
Also that his intention was that his children should 
take all his estate as soon as her prior interest ter-
minated, either by death or renunciation, or otherwise, 
and that he postponed the enjoyment of possession 
of his estate by his children only in order to provide 
17 
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for his wife during her life. When she chose to take 
less than he gave her, his children should not, because 
of some technical rule of law relating to estates follow. 
ing life estates, be made to wait for a full enjoyment 
of their rights. Therefore, where, as here, the testator 
gave all his property to his wife for life, and at her 1 
death to his children then living, and in case of her 
death to their legal representatives share and share 1 
alike, and the widow elected to take against the will, 
this premature termination of her interest as devisee 
caused the interest of the testator's children to be a 
present right of possession, subject only to the widow's 
rights at law, for such is the evident intention of the 
testator, whether under the will the estates of the 
children be considered vested or contingent." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The rule that upon the failure or termination of a prece-
dent estate the rights of the remaindermen are accelerated 
was followed, also, in the following cases: Everett v. Croskrey, 
(1894) 92 Iowa 333, 60 N.W. 732; Brinton v. International 
Trust Co. et al. (1945) 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472; Thomsen 
et al. v. Thomsen (1946) 196 Okla. 539, 166 P.2d 417; 
W achoria Bank v. McEwen ( 1954) 241 N.C. 166, 84 S.E. 
2d 642; Mayhew v. Atkinson (1950) 93 F. Supp. 753; Ward 
v. Ward ( 1941) 153 Kan. 222, 109 P.2d 68, 134 ALR 657; 
Breckenridge v. Breckenridge's Exectttors (1936) 264 Ky. 82, 
94 S.W. 2d 283; Darrow v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co. (Ohio 
1954) 139 N.E. 2d 112. 
Comment upon and analysis of the rule may also be found 
in: American Law Institute, Restatement of Property, §231, 
§238 and Appendix, p. 48 et seq., "Aspects of the Law of 
Acceleration and Sequestration"; 2 Powell on Real Property, 
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par. 313; V American Law of Property, § 21.43; 40 Harv. 
L.R. 758. 
We are ~ware that a testator may so express himself as 
to make it clear that the death of the life tenant is meant to 
be a condition precedent to the vesting of the subsequent 
estate. The cases all recognize this. We have no quarrel with 
Re Hamburger (1924) 185 Wis. 270, 201 N. W. 267, 37 
A.L.R. 1413, cited by appellants. The facts before the court 
made it reasonable to assume that the testator, in separating 
the life estate from the remainder and giving both estates 
to his wife, meant to deprive her of the power to merge them 
a gam. 
Appellants' leading case of Claflin v. Claflin (1889) 
149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454, 3 L.R.A. 3 70, was primarily 
concerned with the effectiveness of provisions in which the 
testator purposely postponed enjoyment. The beneficiary in 
Clccflin was not permitted to receive at age 21 payments that 
the testator wanted him to have at ages 25 and 30. That case 
is summed up briefly in this language of the court: rrNothing 
has happened which the testator did not anticipate, and for 
which he has not made provision." That alone distinguishes 
the case from ours. There is nothing in the Auerbach will 
to indicate that the testator anticipated termination of the 
interest of his widow except by her death; and he made no 
provision for such a contingency. 
The will construed in Mohler v. Wesner ( 1943) 382 Ill. 
225, 47 N.E. 2d 64, cited by appellants, is not set out in detail 
in the report of the case so it is impossible to tell what language 
was considered pertinent, but the court apparently found in 
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the will an expression of intention that the life of testator's 
nephew was to measure the precedent estate. The case does 
differ from our own in that a life estate for the testator's 
widow was not involved. Most of the cases applying the 
acceleration rule seem to be influenced by the fact that the 
life estate was given to the widow. 
Hills v. Travelers Bank and Trust Company (1939) 125 
Conn. 640, 7 A.2d 652, 123 A.L.R. 1419, relied upon by 
appellants, resembles the instant case in that a widow's interest 
was involved; but otherwise it is different in very material 
respects. The widow was given only a portion of the income; 
and like Re Hamburger, supra, the interest of the sons in 
income and principal was separated, with enjoyment of prin-
cipal postponed. Among the fairly complex provisions the 
court found an intention on the part of the testator to use 
the widow's life as a measuring event. The case can be explained 
as one of those that refuse acceleration if the renounced 
interest is to share earnings under a trust with other concurrent 
interests. See Restatement of Property, § 232, Comment b, 
wherein it is stated: 
·'When the terms of a trust provide for other bene-
ficial interests concurrently to share the current earn-
ings of the trust corpus along with the renounced 
interest, a construction is usually justified that the 
·terms and circumstances of the limitation affirmatively 
manifest a purpose which will be more nearly accom-
plished' by the denial of acceleration (see Illustration 
1.) However, the fact that all succeeding interests 
either under or subsequent to the trust and the bene-
ficial interests other than the renounced interest exist 
in the same persons, tends toward a construction that 
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the trust was interposed solei y for the purpose of 
making possible the now renounced beneficial interest 
and that the acceleration of the succeeding interests 
should occur (see Illustration 2)." 
Hill v. Travelers Bank and Trust Co. is thus distinguish-
able from the present case; and, in any event, we question the 
holding. As pointed out in the appendix, "Aspects of the Law 
of Acceleration and Sequestration" in Volume 2 of the Restate-
ment of Property} beginning at page 50, other cases have been 
decided in which concurrent beneficial interests did exist 
and acceleration nevertheless was allowed. The cases cited in 
the appendix appear to be out of harmony with Hills v. Trav-
elers Bank & Trust Co.J as does Illustration 2 to Comment b 
of Section 232 of the Restatement of Property: 
"A, having assets worth upwards of $100,000, 
effectively devises the residue of his esttate to B as 
trustee to pay the net income to his widow C and his 
children D, E and F, in equal shares during the life 
of C and after C' s death to distribute the corpus to 
D, E and F, share and share alike. C renounces the 
provisions made for her by A's will. In the absence 
of further facts the terms and circumstances of this 
limitation do not affirmatively manifest a purpose 
which will be more nearly accomplished by the con-
tinuance of the trust until C' s death. D, E and F are 
entitled to receive their shares in the assets left by A 
freed from the trust." 
Appellants' case of Stevenson v. Stevenson ( 1917) 205 Ill. 
App. 15, involved a will in which there was an express condition 
precedent to determination of members of a class of bene-
ficiaries. The Court discussed the difference between the facts 
before it and the facts present in those cases in which there 
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is a postponement of enjoyment for the benefit of the widow. 
In In re Byrnes' Estate ( 1933), 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y.S. 627, 
the court appeared to make a distinction between acceleration 
of "vested" and "contingent" remainders. The interest of 
Frederick Fox Auerbach is a "vested" remainder. See Restate-
ment of Property, § 253. 
Appellants have quoted from the Restatement of Trusts 
and from Scott on Trusts to the effect that ordinarily all bene-
ficiaries must consent to termination of a trust. The present 
case does not involve termination but construction of the extent 
of existing interests under the trust, and the authorities cited 
do not touch our problem. 
In summary, if it is correct that the acceleration rule ap· 
plies in the absence of an expression of contrary intention 
by the testator, the trial court was correct. Certainly no contrary 
intention can be found within the four corners of the will. 
Appellants, like psychoanalysts dissecting the works of James 
Joyce and T. S. Eliot, have found great significance in what 
appears to innocent usage of words like "excepting", "at the 
time of", "upon", and "pursuant to the terms of this my will"; 
our answer is that there is no need for allegory. If the testator 
had meant to make the widow's death a condition precedent 
to the son's right to receive principal, it would have been easy 
to say so directly. As it is, the language used is very like that 
used in the many cases upholding acceleration; it is perfectly 
consistent with the testator's "presumed intention" that the 
son's estate would vest in possession whenever or however the · 
prior estate ended. 
The will shows that the primary objects of the testator's 
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bounty were his "immediate family", that is, his wife and son. 
For this family the testator established a trust under which his 
widow was to receive the income for life; thereafter it, as well 
as some of the principal, was to be paid to their son. It seems 
apparent that the son's enjoyment was postponed solely for 
the benefit of the widow. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive 
any valid argument for postponing the son's enjoyment in 
event the widow effectually releases her interest. The substance 
of the disposition is not really any different whether the 
property goes to the son during the lifetime of his mother or 
after her death, since he might be the same age in either event. 
Apparently the son's age was the only measuring event with 
which the testator was concerned. He chose specific ages as 
ones at which his son would be able to manage the property-
ages which have nothing to do with whether the widow pre-
deceased the son. Far from showing a contrary intent, the 
will supports acceleration. When the trust has served its purpose 
of benefiting the testator's wife and son it is to be terminated 
and the corpus distributed. 
II 
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED, OR THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AFFIRMED, FOR 
APPELLANTS' FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF THE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. 
Rule 75 (p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure con-
tains the following requirement: 
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"The appellants' brief shall contain in order: * * * 
( 2) a concise statement of the facts of the case, giving 
reference to the pages of the record supporting such 
statement; * * * " 
There is not a single reference in the appellants' brief to 
the page of the record upon which any factual statement is 
to be found. With reference to the matter set out in the 
statement of facts, perhaps this oversight can be forgiven 
since the facts are not extensive; there is no transcript, and 
the essential and material facts can be determined by examin-
ing the complaint, its exhibits, and the answer. In asserting this 
ground for dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the judg-
ment, respondents are not relying upon a technicality. Through 
approximately 8 pages of their brief appellants have set out 
what are intended to be accepted as facts surrounding execu-
tion of and consequently coloring the meaning of the language 
used in the will of Fred erick S. Auerbach. Inasmuch as these 
facts are not evidence, were never offered or introduced in 
the trial court, never suggested before this, are put forward 
as if they were true, and at a stage of the proceedings at 
which it is no longer possible for the respondents to rebut 
them or offer other evidence, the recitation must be regarded 
as a flagrant violation of the rules of this court. It has been 
held that for disregard of the rules an appeal may be dismissed 
or the judgment affirmed. See Drummond v. West (1931), 
212 Cal. 766, 300 Pac. 823; Romero v. Letts, 7 Cal. 2d 503, 
61 P.2d 24 449: The practice of reciting in a brief facts not 
of record has been characterized by one court as "reprehen-
sible." Lady v. Barrett et al. ( 1941), 43 C.A. 2d 685, 111 
P.2d 702. For failure of appellants to comply with the rules 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
relating to briefs, a judgment may be affirmed. Mauldin v. 
Lowery (Colo. 1953) 255 P.2d 976; Grayson v. Grayson 
(1955) 132 C.A. 2d 471, 282 P.2d 565. Or the appeal may be 
dismissed, Mauldin v. Lowery (Colo. 1953), 255 P.2d 976. 
Under Rule 73 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, failure 
to take the steps required to obtain review of the judgment 
may be ground for dismissal of the appeal. 
III 
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS 
OR ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The appellants argue that inasmuch as the action was to 
prevent an "illegal invasion" of the trust property they are 
entitled to counsel fees. The factual answer to this is that no 
"illegal invasion" was shown to have been threatened; the 
legal answer is that most of the cases cited by appellants have 
rejected the proposition advanced. 
Allowance of counsel fees as charges against an estate was 
held to be improper in In re Mundt Estates (1932) 169 Wash. 
593, 14 P.2d 59; In re Gratton's Estate ( 1931) 136 Ore. 224, 
298 Pac. 231; Steger v. Gibson (Okla., 1955), 287 P. 2d 687; 
and In re Cannariato' s Estate ( 1936) 159 Misc. 409, 287 
N.Y.S. 1010. Payment of an attorney's fee from the estate was 
permitted in Becht v.lvfiller (1937), 279 Mich. 629, 273 N.W. 
294, but in a siutation in which the attorney's services had led 
to enhancement of the estate by $30,000. The court took the 
view that the services must benefit the estate as a whole, 
rather than an individual or group interested in the estate. 
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The Illinois case of Tolman v. Reeve (1946) 393 Ill. 273, 
65 N.E. 2d, adopts the view that where a will is so ambiguous 
as to require construction and there is an honest difference of 
opinion the cost of litigation should be borne by the trust 
estate. Although the question appears not to have been decided 
by this court, other states have either rejected or severely 
limited the doctrine. approved in Tolman v. Reeves, and 
we respecfully submit that it should not be followed here. 
In State v. Underwood (1939) 54 Wyo. 1, 86 P.2d 707, 
728, the Supreme Court of Wyoming indicated that allowance 
of the fees was discretionary with the trial court, but that they 
should not be awarded unless the whole estate benefits. In 
Caine v. Payne ( 1951) 191 F.2d 482, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held it improper to 
pay counsel fees out of the fund where the claims of the 
opposing parties were "wholly antagonistic" and each party 
had an attorney who was "bound to serve only the selfish 
interests of those he represented.'' 
Appellants have failed to show that they are entitled to 
counsel fees; moreover, there is no evidence upon which the 
court could find a "reasonable fee." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court was bound 
by the precedents and the facts before it_ to apply the rule 
accelerating remainders. Nowhere in the record is there any 
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evidence that the testator would not desire such acceleration. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. RoE 
ALBERT J. COL'IUN" 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MABEY, 
BILLINGS & STODDARD 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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